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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

July 31, 2015

(U) U.S. Forces Korea Service Components Can Improve Management of Individual Protective Equipment

Classified By: Carol N. Gorman
Derived From Multiple Sources
Declassify On: July 31, 2040

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Results in Brief

(U) U.S. Forces Korea Service Components Can Improve Management of Individual Protective Equipment

July 31, 2015

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether forward deployed forces assigned to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) are equipped to defend against chemical and biological (CB) agents. Specifically, the audit focused on equipment levels for U.S. forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK). This is the first in a series of audits to address CB defense preparedness.

(U) Finding

(U) ARMY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(c)
[Redacted]

- (U) ARMY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(c)
[Redacted]

- (U) NAVY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

- (U) DODIG, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) Finding (cont'd)

(U) DODIG, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

- (U) DODIG, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ ARMY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a) & Sec. 1.4(d) & Sec. 1.4(g), OSD, NAVY, USMC, (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g), USAF, (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(e) & Sec. 1.4(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(U//FOUO) ARMY, NAVY, OSD, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander, MARFORK addressed all specifics of Recommendations 4.a and 4.b, and we do not require additional comments. EUSA, CNFK, and 7th AF did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that EUSA, CNFK, and 7th AF, officials provide comments on the final report. Please see the Recommendations Table on the back of this page.

(U) Recommendations Table

Unclassified Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, Eighth U.S. Army	1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d	
Commander, Naval Forces Korea	2.a, 2.b, 2.c	
Commander, 7th Air Force	3.a, 3.b, 3.c	
Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea		4.a, 4.b Unclassified

(U) Provide Management Comments by August 31, 2015.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 31, 2015

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, EIGHTH U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER, NAVAL FORCES KOREA
COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE
COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS FORCES KOREA

(U) SUBJECT: U.S. Forces Korea Service Components Can Improve Management of Individual Protective Equipment (Report No. DODIG-2015-155)

(U) We are providing this report for your review and comment. DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1 7(e)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In addition, DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1 7(e)
[REDACTED] We performed this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Commander, MARFORK addressed all specifics of the recommendations, and we do not require additional comments. EUSA, CNFK, and 7th AF did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that EUSA, CNFK, and 7th AF officials provide comments on the final report by August 31, 2015.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to DODIG (b)(6) @dodig.smil.mil. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 699-[REDACTED]
(DSN) 499-[REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Carol N. Gorman".

Carol N. Gorman
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Cyber Operations

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(U) Contents

(U) Introduction	1
(U) Objective	1
(U) Background	1
(U) Review of Internal Controls	5
(U) Finding	6
(U) USFK Service Components Can Improve Management of IPE	6
(U) Eighth U.S. Army	7
(U) CNFK	8
(U) 7th Air Force	9
(U) MARFORK	10
(U) Service Components Did Not Always Perform IPE Inspections	11
(U) Conclusion	12
(U) Management Actions	12
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response	13
(U) Appendix A	17
(U) Scope and Methodology	17
(U) Universe and Sample Selection	17
(U) Review of Documentation and Interviews	17
(U) Use of Computer Processed Data	18
(U) Use of Technical Assistance	18
(U) Prior Coverage	18
(U) Appendix B	19
(U) Audit Sample and Results	19
(U) Appendix C	20
(U) Individual Protective Equipment	20
(U) Appendix D	21
(U) U.S. Marine Corps Management Comments	21
(U) U.S. Marine Corps Management Comments (cont'd)	22
(U) Annex	23
(U) Sources	23
(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations	24

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether forward deployed forces assigned to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) are equipped to defend against chemical and biological (CB) agents. Specifically, the audit focused on equipment levels for U.S. forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK). This is the first in a series of audits to address CB defense preparedness. Subsequent audits will address training and exercises for CB defense preparedness.

(U) Background

(U) The 2010 National Security Strategy identifies the need to prevent our enemies from threatening our allies, our friends, and ourselves with weapons of mass destruction as an essential task to ensure national security.

~~(S//ROKUS)~~ ARMY: (b)(1), Sec 1.4(a) & Sec 1.4(c), NAVY: OSD: USMC: (b)(1), Sec 1.4(c), USAF: (b)(1), Sec 1.4(c) & Sec 1.4(g)

(U) Insufficient preparation against recognized weapons of mass destruction could result in a high number of U.S. casualties and an inability to execute the mission. U.S. forces must have the training and equipment to defend against CB weapons to reduce the risk of casualties.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (the Assistant Secretary) is principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on CB defense. The Assistant Secretary develops policies and makes recommendations on CB defense.

(U) The DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program's mission is to enable the warfighter to:

- (U) deter;
- (U) prevent;
- (U) protect;
- (U) mitigate;

- (U) respond; and
- (U) recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

(U) One goal of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program is to equip the force to successfully conduct military operations to prevent, protect, and respond to CBRN threats and effects.

(U) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is one of six geographic combatant commands. USFK is one of the sub-unified commands that support the Commander, PACOM. USFK organizes, trains, and equips U.S. forces in the ROK.


(U) The Service component commands located in the ROK include the:

- (U) Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA);
- (U) Commander, Naval Forces Korea (CNFK);
- (U) 7th Air Force (AF); and
- (U) Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK).

(U) The EUSA and 7th AF have a mission to deter, protect, and defend the ROK from attack; CNFK provides shore installation management and exercises military command over U.S. Navy installations in the ROK; and MARFORK assists with the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and coordination for Marines deploying to the ROK. The organizational structure of PACOM, USFK, and the Service component commands is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. (U) Organizational Structure

Unclassified



Unclassified

(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) Individual Protective Equipment

(U) Individual protection includes actions taken by individuals to survive and sustain operations in a CB environment. For example, sufficient and appropriate equipment must be available to protect the forces. For the audit, we determined whether U.S. forces stationed in the ROK received a protective mask with canisters¹ and the required² CB individual protective equipment (IPE)³ issued for use in an actual CB environment. This includes two sets of:

- (U) protective mask canisters;
- (U) chemical protective (CP) boots;
- (U) CP gloves; and
- (U) Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) coat and trousers (suit).

¹ (U) Protective mask with canisters: the Service member uses the same protective mask for both the training environment and an actual CB environment. For use in an actual CB environment, the Service member exchanges the canisters on the protective mask with one set of mask canisters from their IPE.

² (U) Army in Korea Regulation 725-360, Navy CBRN IPE Handbook, Air Force Instruction 10-2501, and Marine Corps Basis of Issue.

³ (U) Service members receive separate IPE for training purposes.

(U) See Appendix C for a description of the IPE items.

(U) In the ROK, the Services use the following processes to distribute IPE.

- (U) EUSA Service members obtain IPE from Central Issue Facilities (CIFs) located throughout the ROK. The unit CBRN representative issues the protective mask.
- (U) CNFK centrally stores IPE kits⁴ and issue the kits to Service members only when the CB threat increases. The unit CBRN representative issues the protective mask.
- (U) 7th AF Service members obtain IPE, including the protective mask, from the base Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS). Aircrews receive additional IPE⁵ from the Aircrew Flight Equipment representative.
- (U) MARFORK Service members obtain IPE, including the protective mask, from the unit CBRN representative.

(U) Maintenance and Storage Requirements

(U) Although the Services use different processes to distribute IPE, the Joint Service General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) Technical Manual⁶ standardizes protective mask preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS)⁷ and storage requirements. Service members are required to perform protective mask PMCS when they first receive their mask, semiannually, and after each use. It is essential to conduct proper maintenance because an improperly maintained or dirty protective mask can compromise its ability to provide maximum protection to an individual. In addition, protective masks must be stored in a cool, dry, climate-controlled environment because heat and moisture can damage mask and filter materials.

(U) The Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge System

(U) The Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge System (JACKS) is a comprehensive DoD web-based source of CBRN equipment information. The Services use JACKS to monitor IPE shelf-life.

⁴ (U) Kits contain IPE, including mask canisters, CP boots, CP gloves, and JSLIST suits.

⁵ (U) Aircrew receives additional IPE: protective mask, blower and hose assembly, glove inserts, and coveralls.

⁶ (U) Army, Technical Manual 3-4240-542-13&P; Air Force, Technical Order 14P4-20-1; Marine Corps, Technical Manual 09204G/09205G-OI/1; Navy (NAVSEA), S6470-AD-OMP-010, "Joint Service General Purpose Mask (M50/M51) Technical Manual," May 30, 2008.

⁷ (U) PMCS includes various maintenance checks the Service member performs on military equipment.

(U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. NAVY: (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We will provide a copy of this report to the senior officials responsible for internal controls in the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Marine Corps.

(U) Finding

(U) USFK Service Components Can Improve Management of IPE

(U) ~~ARMY, NAVY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~ [Redacted]

- (U) ~~ARMY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~ [Redacted]

- (U) ~~NAVY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~ [Redacted]

- (U) ~~DODIG, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~ [Redacted]

- (U) ~~DODIG, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~ [Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ ~~ARMY, (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a) & Sec. 1.4(d) & Sec. 1.4(g), NAVY, OSD, USMC, (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g), USAF, (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c) & Sec. 1.4(g)~~ [Redacted]

⁸ (U) Unserviceable – materiel that does not meet repair criteria, condemned, or has passed its extendable shelf life.

⁹ (U) For the purpose of this report, inspections refer to command inspections and staff assistance visits.

~~(S//NF)~~ ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a) & Sec. 1.4(d) & Sec. 1.4(g), NAVY, OSD, USMC: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g), USAF: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c) & Sec. 1.4(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted] 10

(U) Eighth U.S. Army

(U) ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
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(U) ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
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(U) ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) EUSA Service Members Needed to Replace Unserviceable IPE

(U) Service members needed to replace unserviceable IPE. Specifically, we identified seven Service members with 13 unserviceable items including, boots, gloves, and trousers. Of the seven Service members, four were from Second Infantry Division (2ID) units, and the remaining three were from other units subordinate to EUSA. The unit CBRN representatives¹¹ stated they were unaware of these unserviceable items and

¹⁰ (U) Appendix B shows the units and Service members by sampled location; the number of Service members not issued IPE; and the number of Service members who did not perform protective mask PMCS.

¹¹ (U) CBRN representatives are Service members responsible for the inventory, maintenance, and storage of the unit's CBRN equipment.

(U) stated the CIF was responsible for monitoring IPE shelf life. However, Army in Korea Regulation 725-360¹² states units will conduct inspections and monitor the shelf life of CBRN equipment.

(U) On November 20, 2014, 2ID issued a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)¹³ to establish a CBRN shelf-life program at the unit level. According to the FRAGO, the shelf life program requires CBRN noncommissioned officers to inventory the IPE of each Service member in the unit and verify that each Service member received all required IPE. In addition, the FRAGO requires unit CBRN noncommissioned officers to use JACKS to monitor IPE shelf life quarterly and to coordinate with CIFs for replacement of unserviceable IPE. According to the FRAGO, 2ID will inspect the unit's shelf life program during all CBRN inspections.

(U) EUSA Generally Stored Unissued Protective Masks Properly

(U) The EUSA generally stored protective masks in accordance with the JSGPM. Of the 19 units reviewed, only 1 improperly stored unissued protective masks. Specifically, the unit stored unissued protective masks outside in a nonclimate-controlled metal container, which exposed the masks to extreme temperatures. According to the unit CBRN representative, he requested through the commander to move the unissued protective masks indoors. The commander postponed the move because of a lack of available storage space.

(U) CNFK

(U) CNFK properly stored required IPE, issued protective masks, and in coordination with the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), ensured IPE was in serviceable¹⁴ condition. NAVY (b)(1), Sec 1 7(c)

(U) CNFK Properly Stored and Maintained Required IPE

(U) CNFK properly stored the required IPE, issued protective masks, and in coordination with the NAVSEA, ensured IPE was in serviceable condition. The Navy centrally stored IPE in kits and issued the kits to Service members only when the CB threat increased. Our review of the CNFK IPE storage area at ARMY (b)(1), Sec 1 7(c)

¹² (U) Army in Korea Regulation 725-360, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Readiness," February 10, 2006, Section II, paragraph 12.c.

¹³ (U) Headquarters, 2ID issued Daily Fragmentary Order 14-11-20 to Operation Order 14-049, 17OCT14, Task Number 140, (Tracking Shelf Life Program for Individual Protective Equipment) Suspende: 06 Feb 15.

¹⁴ (U) Serviceable – new, used, repaired, or reconditioned materiel.

(U) Finding

(U) showed that a sufficient number of kits were centrally stored for CNFK Service members and that the storage area was secured and climate-controlled. In addition, the five CNFK Service members in our sample were issued the required protective masks.

(U) According to the CNFK CBRN representative, the IPE kits arrived from NAVSEA in bags with a serial-numbered seal. If the seal was broken or removed, CNFK returned the kit to NAVSEA for replacement. NAVSEA monitored shelf life and notified CNFK when unserviceable items needed replacement. Because the kits were sealed, we could not view the contents of each kit. However, to determine if the IPE was serviceable, we nonstatistically selected five kits from the NAVSEA shipping manifest and queried items in JACKS. We did not identify any unserviceable IPE.

(U) NAVY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
(U) NAVY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) 7th Air Force

(U) DODIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
(U) DODIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

¹⁵ (U) AFI 10-2501, "Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations," May 10, 2013, Table 5.6.

¹⁶ (U) LRS issues the standard IPE for the Air Force.

(U) Finding

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Service Members Performed Protective Mask PMCS

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) MARFORK

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DODIG (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Service Components Did Not Always Perform IPE Inspections

(U) Service Components did not always perform unit IPE inspections [REDACTED]

ARMY (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NAVY (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]

(U) ARMY (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) NAVY (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]. According to Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5040.3A,¹⁹ unit commanders use inspections and self-assessments to determine the:

- (U) condition of the unit's equipment;
- (U) achievement of technical standards;
- (U) level of training;
- (U) quality of life; and
- (U) use of measures of effectiveness.

(U) NAVY (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹⁷ (U) Command inspections are completed by organizations two echelons above the unit being inspected.

¹⁸ (U) Army Regulation 1-201, "Army Inspection Policy," April 4, 2008, Table B-2.

¹⁹ (U) SECNAV Instruction 5040.3A, "Inspections Within the Department of the Navy," July 13, 2000, paragraph 7.c.

(U) Finding

(U) Of the 7th AF units we reviewed, 11 of the 14 had an inspection in FY 2014 in accordance with Air Force Instruction 10-2501. In addition, emergency management representatives at 4 of the 11 units also conducted self-inspections. [REDACTED]

DODIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED] Inspections on IPE management in all Services needed improvement to ensure the U.S. forces assigned to Korea can meet their wartime requirements.

(U) Conclusion

~~(S//NF)~~ ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a) & Sec. 1.4(g); NAVY: OSD; USMC: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g); USAF: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c) & Sec. 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Actions

(U) EUSA Took Corrective Action

(U) After we notified 2ID that not all of its Service members were issued two sets of mask canisters, 2ID issued a FRAGO²⁰ to direct its subordinate units to ensure each Service member was issued two mask canisters by November 12, 2014. A subsequent FRAGO²¹ extended the issue suspense to February 6, 2015. On March 18, 2015, 2ID informed us they had initiated actions to validate that all 2ID Service members were issued two sets of mask canisters.

²⁰ (U) Headquarters, 2ID issued Daily Fragmentary Order 14-09-25 to Operation Order 13-054, 23OCT12, Task Number 636, (2ID M61 Filter Assembly Turn In) Suspense: 12 Nov 14.

²¹ (U) Headquarters, 2ID issued Daily Fragmentary Order 14-12-17 to Operation Order 14-049, 17OCT14, Task Number 636.1, (2ID M61 Filter Assembly Turn In) Suspense: 06 Feb 15.

(U) MARFORPAC Inspection Identified IPE Deficiencies

(U) On April 23, 2014, MARFORPAC inspected MARFORK CBRN readiness. The inspection found that the unit did not have accountability procedures established for appropriate CBRN equipment to request, inspect, reconcile, and dispose of equipment. In addition, the inspection found MARFORK did not have management procedures established for equipment maintenance that addressed scheduling protective mask PMCS.

(U) At the time of our review, the MARFORPAC CBRN Officer was working with MARFORK to establish a permanent billet to manage the CBRN operations and address the issues identified in the inspection report. According to the MARFORPAC CBRN Officer, he expects to fill the permanent MARFORK billet in the summer of 2015.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Commander, Eighth U.S. Army:

- a. (U//~~FOUO~~) ARMY, OSD, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- b. (U//~~FOUO~~) ARMY, OSD, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- c. (U//~~FOUO~~) ARMY, OSD, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- d. (U//~~FOUO~~) ARMY, OSD, (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(U) Commander, Eighth U.S. Army Comments

(U) The Commander, Eighth U.S. Army did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Commander provide comments on the final report.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Commander, Naval Forces Korea:

- a. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** NAVY, OSD (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
- b. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** NAVY, OSD (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
- c. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** NAVY, OSD (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(U) Commander, Naval Forces Korea Comments

(U) The Commander, Naval Forces Korea did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Commander provide comments to the final report.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Commander, 7th Air Force:

- a. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** OSD (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
- b. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** OSD (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
- c. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** OSD (b)(1), Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(U) Commander, 7th Air Force Comments

(U) The Commander, 7th Air Force did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Commander provide comments on the final report.

(U) Recommendation 4

(U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea:

a. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** OSD (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea Comments

(U) The Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea agreed, stating all current members of MARFORK have the requisite field protective mask and personal protective equipment, and the command has procedures in place to verify Service members are issued required personal protective equipment. In addition, the Commander stated that MARFORK is coordinating with MARFORPAC and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to add a CBRN specialist to the MARFORK table of organization. One of the primary duties of the CBRN specialist will be to supervise the issuance of adequate, serviceable, and properly sized required CBRN personal protective equipment to MARFORK staff in accordance with MARFORK and USFK policies. The specialist will also supervise and implement the overall MARFORK CBRN defense program, to include CBRN training, equipment issuance, tracking and maintenance. The Marine Corps will provide an update on the status of planned corrective actions by January 31, 2016.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

b. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** OSD (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea Comments

(U) The Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea agreed, stating that MARFORK is scheduled to move to new facilities in 2017, however before this it lacks a climate-controlled facility large enough to store the quantities of equipment on hand. The facilities under construction include climate-controlled storage facilities that will have the requisite storage space for all unissued CBRN equipment assigned to

(U) MARFORK. Although the move is not scheduled to occur until 2017, MARFORK expects to have access to the climate-controlled storage facilities at an earlier date. The Marine Corps will provide an update on the status of planned corrective actions by January 31, 2016.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from May 2014 through June 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) Universe and Sample Selection

(U) We obtained a universe of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units and their locations in the ROK and nonstatistically selected [REDACTED] units to review. Of the [REDACTED] units, we nonstatistically selected [REDACTED] Service members. Specifically, we determined the audit sampling would be a two-stage process. In the first stage, the DoD Office of the Inspector General Quantitative Methods Division nonstatistically selected units by installation. In the second stage, the number of personnel within each unit to sample was determined. See Appendix B for the audit sample.

(U) Review of Documentation and Interviews

(U) To obtain clarification on CBRN policies and procedures, we interviewed personnel from:

- (U) the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs;
- (U) the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense;
- (U) EUSA;
- (U) CNFK;
- (U) 7th AF; and
- (U) MARFORK.

(U) For the [REDACTED] units we sampled, we conducted a physical inventory of IPE to determine if Service members were properly equipped. We then used JACKS to determine if the IPE was serviceable. We reviewed maintenance documentation to determine if Service members properly performed maintenance on their protective masks. We also

(U) observed storage facilities to determine if the unit stored unissued protective masks in accordance with technical manual guidance. Furthermore, we reviewed inspection reports to determine whether recent inspections included CB readiness.

(U) Use of Computer Processed Data

(U) We relied on data from JACKS to determine IPE shelf life. To determine the reliability of data, we compared information on Service members IPE including lot numbers, national stock numbers, contract numbers, expiration dates, and dates of manufacture with information contained in JACKS. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We obtained support from the DoD Office of the Inspector General Quantitative Methods Division in developing a nonstatistical sample for review.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage was conducted on the subject during the last 5 years.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Audit Sample and Results

(U) The Table below shows the number of units and Service members sampled by location; number of Service members not issued IPE; and number of Service members who did not have documentation to show they performed protective mask PMCS.

Table. (U) Breakdown of Audit Sample and Results by USFK Location

Unclassified USFK Location	Universe of Units	Number of Units Sampled	Universe of Service Members*	Service Members Sampled	Service Members Not Issued All IPE	Service Members Without PMCS Documentation
Army						
Camp Casey	ARMY: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)					
Camp Hovey						
Camp Jackson						
Camp Stanley						
Yongsan Garrison						
Army Total						
Navy						
Yongsan Garrison	DOD OIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)					
Navy Total						
Air Force						
Kunsan, Air Base	DOD OIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)					
Osan, Air Base						
Air Force Total						
Marine Corps						
Yongsan Garrison	DOD OIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)					
Marine Total						
Total	DOD OIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)					
						Unclassified

*(U) Universe includes only Service members assigned or attached to units sampled.

(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) Appendix C

(U) Individual Protective Equipment

(U) The Table below describes the individual protective equipment reviewed as part of the sample.

Table. (U) Individual Protective Equipment Included in Audit

Unclassified	
Equipment	Description
Protective Mask	Provides above-the-neck protection against CB agents and radioactive particles
Mask Canisters	Removes toxic or irritating (or both) chemical vapors, gases, and particulate contaminants including biological organisms likely to be used in warfare
Boots	Provides foot protection against toxic material, CB warfare agents, and radiological fallout particles
Gloves	Provides hand protection from liquid, vapor, and aerosol CB hazards
JSLIST Suit (Coat and Trousers)	Provides protection from CB agent radiological fallout particles and battlefield contaminants
Additional Air Crew IPE	
Blower and Hose assembly	Removes CB and radiological contaminants from individual hose connect to face mask or headpiece, or both
Coveralls	Provides protection from chemical agents
Glove Inserts	Worn under CP gloves as a liner
Unclassified	

(U) Source: Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge System

(U) Appendix D

(U) U.S. Marine Corps Management Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO:

7500
DMCS-A
13 July 15

(U) From: Head, Audit Coordination, Office of the Director,
Marine Corps Staff

(U) To: Program Director, Readiness and Cyber Operations,
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense

(U) Subj: COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS FORCES KOREA RESPONSE TO DODIG
DRAFT AUDIT REPORT, PROJECT NO. D2014-D000RF-0181.000,
U.S. FORCES KOREA SERVICE COMPONENTS CAN IMPROVE
MANAGEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, DTD
JUNE 11, 2015

(U) Ref: (a) DODIG memorandum of June 11, 2015

(U) Encl: (1) CMDR, MARFORK comments

(U) 1. Official responses required by the reference are provided
at the enclosure.

(U) 2. The Marine Corps appreciates the opportunity to respond
to the draft report.

(U) 3. For classified discussions regarding the responses,
please contact me at my SIPRNet email of record; for unclassified
discussions, please contact me at [REDACTED], or phone
[REDACTED]

USMC (b)(6)

(U) Copy to:
DC, FP&O
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MARFORPAC
MARFORK
TECOM
1GMC

(U) U.S. Marine Corps Management Comments (cont'd)

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**DODIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT DATED JUNE 11, 2015
PROJECT NO. D2014-D000RF-0181.000**

**"U.S. FORCES KOREA SERVICE COMPONENTS CAN IMPROVE MANAGEMENT
OF INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT"**

U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMENTS TO THE DODIG RECOMMENDATIONS

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK):

RECOMMENDATION 4.a.: ~~OSD (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~

COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS FORCES KOREA RESPONSE: Concur. All current members of MARFORK have the requisite field protective mask and personal protective equipment (PPE), and the command has the proper procedures in place to verify this.

MARFORK is coordinating with Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) to have a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 5711 (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Specialist) Staff Sergeant added to the MARFORK table of organization. One of the primary duties of this Marine will be to supervise the issuance of adequate, serviceable, and properly sized required CBRN PPE to MARFORK staff in accordance with MARFORK and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) policies. Other principle responsibilities of the 5711 MOS Marine will be to supervise and implement the overall MARFORK CBRN defense program, to include CBRN training; equipment issuance; tracking and maintenance; CBRN warning and reporting; record keeping; SOP maintenance; and other tasks and responsibilities in accordance with NAVMC 3500.78A. "CBRN Training & Readiness (T&R) Manual." The Marine Corps will provide an update on the status of planned corrective actions by 31 January 2016.

RECOMMENDATION 4.b.: ~~OSD (b)(1), Sec. 1.7(e)~~

COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS FORCES, KOREA RESPONSE: Concur. In the past unissued CBRN equipment has been protected from the elements but not stored in a climate-controlled environment. This is due to the lack of a climate-controlled facility large enough to store the quantities of equipment on hand. MARFORK is scheduled to move to new facilities during 2017; these facilities are currently being constructed at Camp Humphreys and include climate-controlled storage facilities that will have the requisite storage space for all unissued CBRN equipment assigned to MARFORK. While the move is not scheduled to occur until 2017, MARFORK expects to have access to the climate-controlled storage facilities at a much earlier date. The Marine Corps will provide an update on the status of planned corrective actions by 31 January 2016.

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Encl (1)

(U) Annex

(U) Sources

~~(FOUO)~~ Source 1: United States Forces Korea Security Classification Guide,
June 14, 2000 (Document For Official Use Only and Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals)

~~(FOUO)~~ Source 2: The Peninsula Intelligence Estimate
(Document classified Secret // ROKUS)

Declassify On: Source Marked "OADR"

Date of Source: July 2006

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AF	Air Force
CB	Chemical and Biological
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CNFK	Commander, Naval Forces Korea
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
IPE	Individual Protective Equipment
JACKS	Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge System
JSGPM	Joint Service General Purpose Mask
JSLIST	Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
LRS	Logistics Readiness Squadron
MARFORK	Marine Corps Forces Korea
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
PMCS	Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
ROK	Republic of Korea
USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
2ID	Second Infantry Division

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD Hotline Director. For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation, visit www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

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

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